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CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS 
Darian M. Ibrahim 
 Entrepreneurs can now “crowdfund,” or sell securities 
to unaccredited investors over the Internet, to raise 
capital. But will these companies be able to attract the 
follow-on investors (angels and venture capitalists) that 
are necessary for long-term success? Angels and VCs face 
extreme levels of information asymmetry when deciding 
whether to fund a company. Signals can reduce this 
asymmetry. Early commentary argues a company only 
crowdfunds as a last resort for fear of sending a negative 
signal about the company’s quality to follow-on 
investors. This Article argues the inverse. This Article 
argues a successful crowdfunding campaign can send a 
positive signal of a company’s quality to angels and VCs.  
 As this Article explains, crowdfunding can be a savvy 
move for entrepreneurs for both social and financial 
reasons. Crowdfunding, perhaps more than any other 
strategy, shows real-world demand for a company’s 
product or service. For this and other reasons explored 
in the Article, crowdfunding sends a positive signal of 
firm quality, and thus should not disadvantage 
entrepreneurs without wealth or connections who 
depend on crowdfunding to raise funds. The Article also 
posits that crowdfunding signals may reduce the need 
for crowdfunding disclosures, thus making the process 
more affordable to entrepreneurs.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Crowdfunding is the hot new method by which new companies 
can raise their first capital.1 Selling unregistered securities over the 
Internet was prohibited in the past because it constituted a “general 
solicitation” of investors.2 In short, entrepreneurs could only solicit 
investments from those previously known to them. Then came the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act), which 
allowed general solicitation of “accredited” (i.e., wealthy) investors 
in so-called Title II offerings.3 It was not until October 2015 that the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the final rules 
implementing Title III of the JOBS Act, dubbed “Regulation 
Crowdfunding” (Regulation CF), which allowed general 
solicitation—and thus Internet sales—to unaccredited investors.4   
While companies primarily crowdfund to raise capital, this 
Article reveals that a crowdfunding campaign serves important, 
ancillary purposes. Just as patents primarily allocate rights and 
rents while secondarily sending “signals” about firm quality and 
productivity,5 crowdfunding campaigns serve the same dual 
                                                                                                                   
 1  See Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
561, 569 (2015) [hereinafter Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding] (“In equity crowdfunding, 
investors contribute money” over the internet “in exchange for a tangible interest in the 
venture they are funding. . . .”). 
 2  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2017). Rule 504 allows general solicitation, but issuers must 
comply with potentially burdensome state law requirements. See C. Steven Bradford, 
Securities Regulation and Small Business: Rule 504 and the Case for an Unconditional 
Exemption, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 33 (2001) [hereinafter Bradford, Rule 504] 
(“[S]tates remain free to regulate offerings that Rule 504 exempts from the federal 
registration requirements.”). 
 3  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313 
(2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)) (instructing the SEC to remove the 
“prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising” under Rule 506 for sales to 
accredited investors). An “accredited investor” under the securities laws means the investor 
has over $1 million in net worth, or income over $200,000 in each of the last two years (or 
$300,000 with spouse) and reasonably expects to reach the same income level in the current 
year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017). 
 4  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017); Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §§ 301–05, 126 
Stat. at 315-23; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012) (noting that investors making less than 
$100,000 annually can invest up to $2,000, or 5% of annual income or net worth while 
investors making over $100,000 annually can invest up to 10% of annual income or net 
worth). 
 5  See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 637 (2002) (arguing that 
viewing patents as a tradeoff between rents and rights likewise “presents an incomplete 
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functions for new companies. Signals serve to inform potential 
investors about a company’s quality when that quality is otherwise 
difficult to observe.6  Thus, despite early commentary predicting 
that crowdfunding will be an option of last resort for entrepreneurs,7 
a successful crowdfunding campaign can actually send a positive 
signal about firm quality to follow-on investors, namely angels and 
venture capitalists (VCs).8 
Some companies that crowdfund may not seek follow-on 
investors, instead being content to exist as so-called “lifestyle” 
companies run for the benefit of the entrepreneur and the 
entrepreneur’s family.9 Early companies who have conducted 
crowdfunding campaigns have been in the food, beverage, and other 
consumer products industries and do not fit the technically-
innovative mold of Apple or Tesla.10 However, rapid-growth 
companies that go on to seek angel or VC investment11 have also 
                                                                                                                   
picture of the value and function of patents”); id. (exploring “the value of patents as 
informational mechanisms”). 
 6  See generally Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
 7  See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 8  See infra Part III.C. 
 9  Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should 
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 111–12 (“A startup company is a new 
venture with an innovative product or business model that targets rapid growth. This 
definition distinguishes startup companies from ‘livelihood businesses,’ which generate 
income for the company founders and employees, but lack significant prospects for generating 
large returns to outside investors through an initial public offering of stock (‘IPO’), or by being 
acquired.” (quoting John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A 
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 862 (2005)). 
 10  See Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1506 
(2017) (“[P]erhaps [startups that crowdfund] are not the type of companies that will attract 
angels or VCs at all.”); see, e.g., Invest in Native American Natural Foods: Buffalo Based Meat 
and Fruit Bars Based on the Wasna Tradition of the Lakota, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/tankabar (last visited Oct. 19,  2018); Invest in San Francisco East Bay 
Brewing Inc.: Bringing San Francisco Craft Beer to Untapped Asian Markets, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/sfebb (last visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
 11  There may be distinctions to draw between crowdfunding companies that later seek 
angel as opposed to VC financing. Because angels have non-financial as well as profit motives 
for investing, they are less likely to be concerned with some of the problems discussed infra, 
such as an unwieldy capitalization table, that VCs will care about. See Darian M. Ibrahim, 
The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1439 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ibrahim, Angel Investors] (“[A]ngels also have nonfinancial reasons for investing. 
A distinguishing characteristic of angel investment is that angels ‘usually develop an 
emotional attachment to the business venture.’”). 
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first looked to the crowd. Both tech12 and non-tech companies13 are 
trying to raise money through crowdfunding. For growth companies, 
attracting follow-on investment is the key to success.14 Virtual-
reality pioneer Oculus is a notable success.15 Oculus began with a 
successful crowdfunding campaign on Kickstarter,16 raised $16 
                                                                                                                   
 12  For example, Zenefits (a human resources software firm) got early funding through 
WeFunder and later received funding from Fidelity, Andressen Horowitz, and Venrock. See 
Alex Patriquin, Zenefits $500m Series B Nets 4,000% Unrealized Return to Wefunder 
Investors, WEFUNDER (June 3, 2014), https://wefunder.com/post/44-zenefits-delivers-over-4-
000-unrealized-return-to-wefunder-investors; Jeremy Quittner, How This $4.5 Billion 
Benefits Startup Plans to Maintain Its Dominance, INC. (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/zenefits-top-ranking-unicorn-for-2015-must-keep-
innovating-to-win.html; Geoff Weiss, Zenefits, a 2-Year Old Startup, Is Now Valued at $4.5 
Billion, ENTREPRENEUR (May 6, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/245937. 
However, Zenefits got caught up in a scandal over whether its agents were selling insurance 
without a license (among other improper behavior), and its valuation fell from $4.5 billion to 
$2 billion. See Heather Somerville, Software Startup Zenefits Changes Course Under New 
CEO, REUTERS (Sept. 21, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-zenefits-
broker/software-startup-zenefits-changes-course-under-new-ceo-idUSKCN1BW1NS; Claire 
Suddath & Eric Newcomer, Zenefits Was the Perfect Startup. Then It Self-Disrupted: What 
Happened When an HR Firm Had Some Epic HR Problems., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(May 9, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-zenefits/. 
 13  See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 578 (describing the Title II site 
CircleUp, which “does not raise money for tech-based companies, instead focusing on 
consumer products companies, but, importantly, it still caters to growth startups as opposed 
to lifestyle firms” (citing Lora Kolodny, Collaborative Fund, CircleUp Partner To Invest $4 
Million in B Corps, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/venture capital/2014/08/18/collaborative-fmd-circleup-partner-to-invest-
4-million-n-b-corps)); id.  (“As CircleUp’s co-founder explains, ‘[w]e don’t have any companies 
on the site who are looking at it as a lifestyle business,’ noting that ‘typically these companies 
will exit to a private equity fund or strategic acquisition.’” (quoting Christine Lagorio-
Chafkin, CircleUp Draws More Investors as Equity Crowdfunding Gains Ground, INC. (Mar. 
26, 2014), http://www.inc.com/chrstine-lagorio/circleup-bright-spot-crowdfunding.html)) 
(alteration in original). 
 14  See Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1411 (discussing work by Paul Gompers 
and Josh Lerner that “found that ninety percent of start-ups that were unable to attract 
venture capital within the first three years failed, while the failure rate dropped to thirty-
three percent for those that did attract venture capital”) (citation omitted). 
 15  See, e.g., OCULUS, https://www.oculus.com/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2017).  
 16  Kickstarter crowdfunding is different than the crowdfunding discussed in this Article 
in that it does not involve the sale of securities. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra 
note 1, at 568-569 (distinguishing broadly between equity and non-equity crowdfunding). 
However, for signaling purposes, this legal distinction may hold little relevance. Although it 
would affect this Article’s sub-arguments regarding capitalization tables, potential lawsuits, 
and the like. See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text. 
 
 202  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:197 
 
million from VCs after the crowdfunding campaign, and was sold to 
Facebook for $2 billion.17 
In this Article, I apply the economic literature on signaling to 
crowdfunding and show that an entrepreneur’s decision to 
crowdfund—if that crowdfunding campaign is successful18—can 
send a better signal of firm quality to angels and VCs than pre-
crowdfunding signals. Because it adds a signaling function on top of 
the capital-raising function, crowdfunding can send a better signal 
for success than “friends-and-family” money.19  
In an environment rife with information asymmetry, signaling 
takes on added importance.20  Although crowdfunding is still in its 
infancy, early commentators predict that it is destined for failure.21 
Those commentators suggest that crowdfunding, to the extent it 
signals anything, signals a weak company.22 Companies that 
crowdfund, the argument goes, are being shunned by the traditional 
sources of entrepreneurial finance—early-stage angels, VCs, even 
friends and family—and opt to crowdfund only as a means of last 
resort.23 In short, these companies are the lemons of the startup 
world that have little staying power and little chance to become 
household names. 
Arguing the opposite, this Article contends that crowdfunding 
can be viewed as a positive, rather a negative signal—and, in 
important respects, is a better alternative than other means of early 
financing, most notably friends-and-family money. As explained in 
this Article, crowdfunding can be a savvy move for entrepreneurs 
for social and financial reasons.24 Crowdfunding also does more 
than perhaps any other move an early-stage company can make to 
                                                                                                                   
 17  See Jack Wroldsen, Crowdfunding Investment Contracts, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 543, 
548–550 (2017) (discussing the Oculus trajectory). 
 18  See infra Part III.A for signaling effects of successful versus unsuccessful crowdfunding 
campaigns. 
 19  See Christopher W. Cole, Note, Financing an Entrepreneurial Venture: Navigating the 
Maze of Corporate, Securities, and Tax Law, 78 UMKC L. REV. 473, 482–83 (2009) (discussing 
friends-and-family investments). Although it is true that friends-and-family money can show 
the entrepreneur has “skin in the game” and may work harder for the company’s success. 
 20  See infra notes 46–49. 
 21  See id. 
 22  See infra Part III.B. 
 23  See id. 
 24  See infra Part III.C. 
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signal real-world demand for its product or service.25 A successful 
crowdfunding campaign shows follow-on investors that the 
company has a real customer base.26 Crowdfunding can help 
democratize entrepreneurship and make it more affordable for 
entrepreneurs to pursue their innovations.27 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the economic 
literature on signaling: when signaling is important and what 
makes a signal effective; why signaling is especially important in 
entrepreneurial finance; and what signals angels and VCs relied on 
in choosing companies to fund pre-crowdfunding. Part III 
introduces crowdfunding as a new signal for angels and VCs to use 
in selecting their investments and argues that, despite early 
predictions about crowdfunding’s inevitable failure, a successful 
crowdfunding campaign can reflect positively on a company to 
angels and VCs. Part IV discusses the normative and legal 
implications of crowdfunding properly viewed as a positive rather 
than a negative signal. Part V concludes. 
II. SIGNALING THEORY 
Signaling is an important concept in the law-and-economics 
literature.28 This Part has three objectives: to discuss (1) why 
signals are an important tool in helping to combat information 
asymmetry; (2) why extremely high levels of information 
asymmetry make signaling paramount in entrepreneurial finance; 
and (3) what signals are used in entrepreneurial finance pre-
crowdfunding, as well as the shortcomings of using those signals. 
                                                                                                                   
 25  See infra Part III.C.1. 
 26  This may not be as true for pure tech companies as it is for consumer product companies. 
However, apps and the like will probably have dedicated users. See infra note 104 and 
accompanying text. 
 27  See infra Part IV.A. 
 28  See Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other 
Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 101 (2007) (“[T]he law and economics literature 
widely cites Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence for the proposition that signaling 
opportunities can generate efficiency gains by enabling uninformed parties to distinguish 
between higher- and lower-quality counterparties . . .”) (emphasis and citation omitted); 
Spence, supra note 6, at 358–59 (explaining how potential employees signal quality by 
engaging in costly activities, such as obtaining a degree). 
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A. WHY DO MARKET PARTICIPANTS NEED SIGNALS, AND WHAT MAKES 
A SIGNAL EFFECTIVE? 
“Insiders know more than outsiders. Both have incentives to 
mitigate the asymmetry.”29  This incentive is especially true in 
financial transactions when insiders attempt to sell company 
securities to outsiders.30 Information asymmetry exists in varying 
degrees in financial markets. For the largest and most well-known 
blue-chip companies, information asymmetry is remedied in 
numerous ways: analysts rate the company’s securities,31 securities 
law forces insiders to disclose information about the company,32 
newspapers cover the company’s major moves,33 and reputational 
concerns influence the company’s actions.34  
But information asymmetry persists, especially with lesser-
known companies.35 The cost of remedying information asymmetry 
can be high: investors must find, process, and verify information.36 
Apart from large mutual funds and hedge funds, most investors do 
                                                                                                                   
 29  Roy Shapira, Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-optation, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1889, 1906 (2012). 
 30  Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 91, 92 (1998) (“[T]he single largest cost that stands between 
issuers and investors is the problem of asymmetric information. The issuer knows the quality 
of the securities being offered, but the investor does not and cannot easily find out.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 31  Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators 
argued that selective disclosure to securities analysts is beneficial to the securities markets 
because it increases the dissemination and incorporation of information into stock price.”). 
 32  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 674–75 (1984) (arguing that voluntary information 
disclosures reduce information costs). 
 33  See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, & Paul C. Tetlock, Short Selling and the News: 
A Preliminary Report on an Empirical Study, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 646 (2010) 
(discussing the connection between releasing false news and short selling). 
 34  See Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 741, 764 (2000) (“Transaction costs in financial markets are low, liquidity high. Parties 
interact in continuous relationships governed by reputational considerations.”). 
 35  Even with the best-known companies, inside information is non-public and thus 
unknown to investors. See Manuel A. Utset, Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct as 
Securities Fraud, 54 B.C. L. REV. 645, 649 (2013) (distinguishing between market and insider 
information for signaling in corporate finance). 
 36  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 597, 611 fig. 4 (1984) (displaying the high information costs in acquiring, 
processing, and verifying market information). 
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not have the time or motivation to process all the information that 
is available on a company.37 The behavioral law-and-economics 
literature indicates that investors exhibit bounded rationality, 
meaning they use shortcuts when making decisions.38 Thus, 
investors’ reliance on signals about a company’s quality can be 
efficient and useful. 
Signals are a proxy for a company’s quality when that quality is 
difficult or costly to discern.39 The use of signals in financial markets 
is well documented. For example, hiring a top investment bank 
when undertaking an initial public offering (IPO) signals a 
company’s quality when the company to-date has been privately-
held and therefore opaque to the market at large.40 Similarly, a 
stock buyback by a public company signals to the market that the 
company’s managers believe the company’s stock is undervalued.41 
                                                                                                                   
 37  Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 19 (1994) (“[M]ost investors do not read, 
let alone thoroughly analyze, financial statements, prospectuses, or other corporate 
disclosures . . . .”). 
 38  See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (“To deal with limited brain power and 
time we use mental shortcuts and rules of thumb.”). 
 39  See Long, supra note 5, at 645 (“One strategy firms can use to convey information about 
attributes that are not easily discernible is signaling. A signal in this context is just a variable 
with low measurement costs that observers believe is not independently distributed relative 
to variables presenting high measurement costs.”); see also F.H. Buckley, When the Medium 
is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 IND. L.J. 493, 526 (1990) (“Signaling 
strategies diminish information costs borne by the firm’s investors, and reduce its cost of 
capital.”); J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 922 (2003) (“Relying on 
signals is a time-honored way to economize on information costs.”).  
 40  WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 443 (11th ed. 2010) (“Many familiar market 
institutions, such as the investment banking firm, can be understood as 
market mechanisms for reducing information costs.”); Partnoy, supra note 34, at 773–74 (“To 
stem some investor concerns about their reputations, managers generally select one or more 
third-party intermediaries (typically investment banks and accounting firms) to assist with 
new issues. These intermediaries are willing to stake their reputational capital on their 
ability to evaluate a firm and its management, to ensure that managers are not appropriating 
(too much) shareholder wealth.”) (citation omitted). 
 41  See Buckley, supra note 39, at 537–40. Conversely, an equity issuance is usually seen 
as a negative signal. See Anton Miglo, Trade-Off, Pecking Order, Signaling, and Market 
Timing Models, in CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISIONS: THEORY, 
EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 171, 179 (2011) (“A negative share price reaction on the 
announcement of equity issues is usually consistent with empirical evidence”); see also Jeff 
Strnad, Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399, 412–18 (2003) (discussing the 
signaling function of convertible debt). 
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For a signal to be effective, it must be both observable and costly.  
Signals work precisely because they are easier to discern than 
company quality; thus, they must be observable. Enhancing the 
salience of a signal increases its effectiveness.42 But the signal must 
also be costly.43 If a signal is cheap to send, a bad company can send 
it just as easily as a good company.44 Therefore, good companies will 
attempt to send signals that are too costly for bad companies to 
mimic (e.g., hiring Goldman Sachs to underwrite their IPO).45 
B. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 
Information asymmetry is extremely high in entrepreneurial 
finance. Brand new companies have no track record or established 
product or service for investors to rely on; oftentimes, these 
companies are just an idea, prototype, or product in its infancy.46 
Barriers to entry may be low, meaning the entrepreneur’s idea—
even if proven—may be doomed by a competitor’s first-mover 
advantage.47 Scientific uncertainty and complexity in technology-
based innovations adds to the information asymmetry between the 
                                                                                                                   
 42  Utset, supra note 35, at 668 (“Message magnification is one way to increase the salience 
of messages. The more salient a signal, the more likely that investors will incorporate it into 
their decision making.”) (citations omitted). 
 43  ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (2000) (“Signals reveal type if only the good 
types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone knows this.”). 
 44  Merritt B. Fox, Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles, 66 
DUKE L.J. 673, 687 (2016) (“Signaling will fail to eliminate the information-asymmetry 
problem, however, if a seller’s claim of high quality is not completely credible.”). 
 45  Utset, supra note 35, at 653 (“Good companies will . . . try to identify expensive signals—
courses of action that are too costly for bad companies to undertake. If one exists, they will 
incur the cost of sending the signal, with the expectation that the bad companies will not 
follow suit . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 46  See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076–77 (2003) (“Precisely because the portfolio company 
is at an early stage, uncertainty concerning future performance is magnified. Virtually all of 
the important decisions bearing on the company’s success remain to be made, and most of the 
significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the company’s efforts remain 
unresolved.”); id. at 1076 (“The special character of venture capital contracting is shaped by 
the fact that investing in early stage, high technology companies presents [information 
asymmetry] in an extreme form.”). 
 47  Roger A. Kerin, P. Rajan Varadarajan & Robert A. Peterson, First-Mover Advantage: A 
Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions, 56 J. MARKETING 33, 33 (1992) 
(discussing the link between order of entry into market and market share).  
 
 2018]   CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS 207 
 
startup’s management and potential investors.48 Angels and VCs 
must navigate this treacherous terrain to choose among the 
thousands of new companies seeking their funding.49 Traditionally, 
these investors have decided which companies to invest through 
networks, contracts, and signals.50  
Angels, and to a lesser extent VCs, rely on networks to sort 
among potential investments. Networks work in traditional 
angel/VC investing because of the tight geographic proximity 
between entrepreneur and investor.51 Both angels and VCs have 
long preferred to invest locally, often within a short drive of 
themselves.52 For their deal flow, angels rely on a “network of 
trusted” advisers including business associates, accountants, and 
lawyers.53 VCs likewise prefer to invest in entrepreneurs with whom 
they know and feel comfortable.54 Networks are therefore an 
                                                                                                                   
 48  See id. at 1077 (“[T]he technology base of the portfolio company’s business exacerbates 
the general uncertainty by adding scientific uncertainty.”). 
 49  For example, in 1997, leading Silicon Valley VC Benchmark Partners funded only nine 
of the 1500 business plans submitted to them. RANDALL E. STROSS, EBOYS: THE TRUE STORY 
OF THE SIX TALL MEN WHO BACKED EBAY, WEBVAN, AND OTHER BILLION-DOLLAR START-UPS 
24 (2000). 
 50  As discussed later, one of the main ways in which investors in public companies mitigate 
information asymmetries—disclosure—is not required in offerings to angels and VCs. See 
infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text. 
 51  See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 561 (“Venture capitalists (VCs) and 
angel investors have long valued close networks and personal relationships when selecting 
which entrepreneurs to fund, and they closely monitor their investments in person after they 
fund.”). See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (describing intimate Silicon Valley 
culture). 
 52  See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE CAP. 101, 
112 (1999) (explaining that angels live close to their investments); see also Venture Support 
Systems Project: Angel Investors, MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR. 32 table 3.2 (2000), 
http://nutsandbolts.mit.edu/resources/angelreport.pdf (“Most active angels will not invest in 
opportunities outside a 1-2 hour driving range.”). 
 53  Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1432; see also Stephen Prowse, Angel 
Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 785, 789 (1998) (“The 
primary criterion that angels use to screen proposals is whether the entrepreneur is 
previously known and trusted by them or by an associate who they trust.”). 
 54  See Alex Iskold, 8 Things You Need to Know About Raising Venture Capital, 
ENTREPRENEUR (July 15, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/248377 
[https://perma.cc/C7RA-MCSG] (explaining that VCs feel more comfortable considering 
investing in someone who is somehow connected to them). 
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effective tool for reducing information asymmetry.55 However, as 
the Internet reduces the necessity of geographic proximity, 
networks diminish in their utility. Entrepreneurs no longer have to 
move to Silicon Valley to seek funding—they can do so over the 
Internet.56 
The second way in which VCs, and to a lesser extent angels,57 
mitigate information asymmetry is through the use of detailed 
investment contracts. The typical VC investment contract includes 
many protective provisions. The most important of these for 
reducing information asymmetry is the practice of “staged 
financing,”58 or financing the company in stages instead of all at 
once. By allowing investors to gather more concrete evidence about 
the company between each stage of financing, staged financing 
reduces information asymmetry directly. Importantly, if the 
evidence portends bad outcomes, VCs have the option to abandon 
the investment altogether.59 As discussed in the next section, staged 
financing also reduces information asymmetry indirectly, through 
signals.  
                                                                                                                   
 55  See Eugenia Macchiavello, Peer-to-Peer Lending and the “Democratization” of Credit 
Markets: Another Financial Innovation Puzzling Regulators, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 521, 577 
(2015) (“[T]he use of social networks backed by financial commitments in the form of early 
financing has appeared a determinant of a campaign success as well as a mechanism to 
reduce information asymmetries.” (citation omitted)). 
 56  See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 564 (“As startups need less money 
to ramp up, and because it is cheaper and more efficient to raise money online than in person, 
startups will likely raise an increasingly large percentage of funds over the Internet.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 57  The more organized, “professional” angel groups may mirror the VC’s investment 
contract, while “traditional” angel investors who operate more loosely rely primarily on 
networks to screen their investments. See Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1446 
(“[A]ngel group investment contracts bear a closer resemblance to venture capital contracts 
than to traditional angel contracts, albeit without some of the venture capitalist’s bells and 
whistles.”). 
 58  See Gilson, supra note 46, at 1073 (“The initial venture capital investment usually will 
be insufficient to fund the portfolio company’s entire business plan. Accordingly, investment 
will be ‘staged.’ A particular investment round will provide only the capital the business plan 
projects as necessary to achieve specified milestones set out in the business plan.”). 
 59  Id. at 1081 (“By accepting a contractual structure that imposes significant penalties if 
the entrepreneur fails to [meet] specified milestones based on the business plan’s 
projections—the venture capital fund’s option to abandon then becomes exercisable—the 
entrepreneur makes those projections credible.”). 
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C. SIGNALS USED IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE PRE-
CROWDFUNDING 
Angels and VCs also rely on signals to mitigate information 
asymmetry when screening potential investments.60 VCs and angels 
generally have three signals to assess a potential investment: (1) 
the identity of the company’s early investors, (2) the investment 
contracts the VCs inked with entrepreneurs, and (3) the company’s 
patenting activity.61 Unfortunately, there are problems with relying 
on these signals for ex ante investment selection. 
The first signal, looking at who has already funded the company, 
can certainly be credible. Prominent individual angels, such as 
LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman and professional angel groups like 
Silicon Valley’s Band of Angels, are likely to have their choice of top 
investments. Therefore, companies funded by these angels send a 
credible signal of high quality to VCs who may follow.62 However, 
not all companies can attract the attention of a prominent angel or 
investment group. Absent these investors, startups can rely on 
friends and family, but these investors do not send the same signal 
                                                                                                                   
 60  Note an important distinction: this Article is not discussing the signals that investors 
in crowdfunding campaigns themselves might use when selecting among startups seeking 
crowdfunding funds. See Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et al., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 39 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 955, 959 (2015) (stating that information asymmetries 
between investors and entrepreneurs are “even more pronounced in an equity crowdfunding 
context . . . because small investors are less likely to have experience evaluating investment 
opportunities”); see also Ethan Mollick & Alicia Robb, Democratizing Innovation and Capital 
Access: The Role of Crowdfunding, 58 CAL. MGMT. REV. 72, 74 (2016) (“While a lot is known 
about the signals VCs look for when funding a venture, we know much less about how the 
crowd decides what to fund.”). 
 61  See Darian Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 749–
50 (2010) [hereinafter Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley] (noting that private VCs send signals 
regarding which start-ups they fund and that VCs look to the start-ups’ patents and 
investment contract).   
 62  See J.W. Verret, Uber-ized Corporate Law: Toward a 21st Century Corporate 
Governance for Crowdfunding and App-Based Investor Communications, 41 J. CORP. L. 927, 
934 (2016) (“Information problems not resolved by intermediaries could be resolved by the 
signal of an initial anchor investor. For example, seed funding from a venture capital (VC) 
could be a vitally important initial signal for crowdfunded entities. This way crowdfunders 
could free ride on the initial investment of diligence by the VC.”).  
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of quality as angels and VCs because they will support the startup 
for reasons other than an eventual return.63  
Another pre-crowdfunding signifier of a high-quality company is 
said to be the entrepreneur’s willingness to accept certain contract 
terms. Accepting staged financing from VCs, with more funding 
contingent on the next milestone, is thought to signal an 
entrepreneur’s confidence in reaching that milestone.64  “Bad” 
entrepreneurs will not be confident of their ability to reach the 
milestones and will want all funding upfront.65 The same is true of 
granting VCs “preferred stock” as opposed to granting the 
entrepreneur common stock.66 Because a VC’s preferred stock will 
get paid on sale or liquidation before the common stock receives any 
payout, an entrepreneur who accepts “inferior” common stock is 
thought to signal their belief that the value of the startup will be 
more than the VC’s preferences.67  
The problem is that contract-based signals are not particularly 
credible.68 Given how difficult it is to achieve VC financing, an 
entrepreneur who is offered several million dollars to grow their 
venture will probably agree to almost any contractual terms. This 
is certainly not true of all entrepreneurs. For instance, “serial” 
entrepreneurs on their third or fourth successful venture will have 
far more leverage69 and likely have the financial resources to hire 
                                                                                                                   
 63  JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 213 (John Paul Riquelme 
ed., W.W. Norton 2007) (1916) (“Whatever else is unsure in this stinking dunghill of a world 
a mother's love is not.”). 
 64  See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture 
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 56 (Ashgate 
ed., 2001) (“The prospect of an initially small investment keyed to a performance milestone 
will tend to deter an entrepreneur from approaching a VC with a low quality business and 
exaggerating its prospects.”). 
 65  See Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 751 (“When entrepreneurs agree 
to delay future funding until reaching certain benchmarks, it sends a signal that this is a 
high-quality entrepreneur who believes these benchmarks will be reached.”). 
 66  See Gilson, supra note 46, at 1072 (“The venture capital fund’s equity investments in 
portfolio companies typically take the form of convertible preferred stock.”). 
 67  See Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 751–52 (discussing the signals 
that entrepreneurs send by selling preferred stock to private VCs while holding common 
stocks themselves). 
 68  See id. at 752 (stating that signals based on investment contracts have questionable 
credibility).  
 69  See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 315 n.130 (2013) 
(“[T]he culture of Silicon Valley lionizes the serial entrepreneur.”); see also John F. Coyle & 
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an attorney to negotiate.70 But for the vast majority of first-time 
entrepreneurs seeking their first VC funding, agreeing to staged 
financing and preferred stock is simply the price of attracting a VC’s 
investment.71 
VCs have also looked to a startup’s patenting activity as a 
marker of potential success.72 The argument is that new companies 
with more patents are, all other things equal, better investments. 
However, intellectual property experts have now seemed to coalesce 
around the idea that a startup’s patents have, at best, limited 
signaling value. Patents do signal that an entrepreneur is 
“disciplined in [her] engineering approach”73 and not lazy.74 Patents 
also signal that a new company is of the rapid-growth variety, as 
opposed to a lifestyle firm.75  
But patents do not necessarily signal market dominance in the 
patented technology. Ronald Mann has observed that software 
patents are often rendered obsolete by rapidly-changing 
                                                                                                                   
Joseph M. Green, Startup Lawyering 2.0, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1403, 1426 (2017) (quoting a lawyer 
as saying, “A lot of the work we do puts us at risk of not ever getting paid. Sometimes we’ll 
assume that risk knowingly, as when a serial entrepreneur has a really hot startup. We’ll run 
a tab and count on the funding to come through at some point.”). 
 70  See Paul Gompers et al., Performance Persistence in Entrepreneurship, 96 J. Fin. Econ. 
18, 19 (“[E]ntrepreneurs with a track record of success can more easily attract suppliers of 
capital, labor, goods and services if suppliers believe there is performance persistence. A 
knack for choosing the right industry-year in which to start a company generates additional 
subsequent excess performance if, as a result, the entrepreneur can line up higher quality 
resources for his next venture.”). 
 71  See Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 751–52 (noting that most 
entrepreneurs would not reject staged financing or preferred stock, as both are difficult to 
obtain). 
 72  Long, supra note 5, at 646 (“Intellectual property can serve as a signal of less readily 
measurable attributes . . . . The quantity and quality of the patents in the portfolio can serve 
as a signal of other firm attributes, as can the order in which the firm applies for the 
patents.”).  
 73  Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 961, 993 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Long, supra note 5, at 654 
(“Nobody associates obtaining patents with sloth and shiftlessness.”). 
 74  Mann, supra note 73, at 994 (patents “reflect[] something positive about the ability of 
the management team to focus and execute” and “nothing about the uniqueness of the 
technology or the firm’s ability to ex[c]lude competitors”). 
 75  Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1191 (2010) 
(discussing interviews with venture lenders who revealed that “a start-up that has IP signals 
itself as a rapid-growth company as opposed to a lifestyle firm”). 
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technology,76 and that it is difficult to patent an entire software 
product or understand what is exactly covered.77 Consequently, in 
software at least, the very decision to obtain a patent—as opposed 
to continuing product development and consumer testing—reveals 
an entrepreneur who focuses on the wrong priorities.78 Thus, 
patents, if even available as a signal, may send mixed messages to 
potential investors.79  
For the reasons above, the signals on which angels and VCs have 
traditionally relied turn out to be of limited use in ex ante 
investment selection. But information asymmetry between 
entrepreneurs and investors still exists in the extreme, and 
signaling will be as important as ever for new companies seeking 
investors. All of which leads to this Article’s main argument: for new 
companies that plan to seek angel or VC funding down the road, 
completing a successful crowdfunding campaign is a new and 
positive signal an entrepreneur can send about her company’s high 
quality.  
III. CROWDFUNDING AS A NEW SIGNAL OF HIGH QUALITY 
This Part will introduce the existence of a crowdfunding 
campaign as a new signal of firm quality. As previously discussed, 
effective signals must be both costly and observable.80 
Crowdfunding is costly not only because entrepreneurs are granting 
investors a piece of their company, but because undertaking a 
crowdfunding campaign requires significant disclosure and 
                                                                                                                   
 76  See Mann, supra note 73, at 979 (“[T]echnology tends to develop so rapidly that by the 
time a patent is issued—and the formal right to exclusivity commences—the technology may 
be obsolete.”). 
 77  See id. (“[I]t is difficult to patent an entire product in the software industry because any 
particular product is likely to include dozens if not hundreds of separate technological 
ideas.”); id. (observing “the difficulty of being sure that a competing product infringes a 
patent”). 
 78  See id. at 982 (emphasizing that “attention to patents can be damaging to a startup 
because it has the potential to divert limited time and resources from . . . a highly time-
pressured effort to develop a product and convince customers and investors of its worth before 
the firm runs out of capital resources”). 
 79 See id. at 980–81 (“The general theme . . . is that there are many factors that play into 
the ability of a startup firm to obtain funding and success and that intellectual property has 
a low place on the list of factors, if it appears on that list at all.”). 
 80  See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text. 
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associated costs.81 Further, crowdfunding is costly in the sense that 
failure may doom a nascent company from the outset.  
Crowdfunding is also salient: a company that crowdfunds will be 
listed on a funding portal’s website, file forms with the SEC, and 
may be featured in newspaper or online articles. Given that 
crowdfunding campaigns should send credible signals to the 
market, the question remains: are these signals all bad, as currently 
intimated, or are they positive? 
A. SUCCESSFUL VS. UNSUCCESSFUL CROWDFUNDING CAMPAIGNS 
First, we must distinguish between crowdfunding campaigns 
that raise the desired funds and those that do not. A company’s 
failure to raise the desired funds in a crowdfunding campaign sends 
a negative signal to follow-on investors because it demonstrates a 
lack of market interest in the company’s product. Therefore, it will 
be important to empirically track what percentage of crowdfunding 
campaigns are successful. The rarer a successful crowdfunding 
campaign is, on average, the stronger a positive signal success 
would send. But that positive signal must be strong enough that it 
attracts follow-on investment; otherwise, companies will not accept 
the risk of an unsuccessful crowdfunding campaign.  
The success of a campaign can be found by calculating the ratio, 
S, between the amount raised, a, and the amount desired, d. This 
formula is expressed below: 
S = a/d 
When S ≥ 1, the campaign is successful. When S < 1, the 
campaign has not been successful.82  
                                                                                                                   
 81  See Houman B. Shadab, Henry Manne and Nonpublic Company Disclosure, 12 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 361, 368 (2016) (“Crowdfunding companies must file Form C containing 
extensive disclosures, including about issuer’s business, its capital structure, how its 
securities were valued, and a narrative of its financial condition.”); Samuel G. Wieczorek, 
Regulation Crowdfunding: A Viable Option for the Franchising Industry?, 36 FRANCHISE L.J. 
275, 283 (2016) (complying with Regulation CF “would, in all likelihood, entail hiring legal 
counsel to assist in completing the offering disclosure statement . . . and in many cases engage 
an independent accountant to prepare either reviewed or audited financial statements”). 
 82  This assumes an all-or-nothing campaign. It is also possible that, with greater 
experience, investors may require some multiple of the amount raised to the amount desired, 
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The success rate of a series of campaigns can be found by 
calculating the ratio, R, between the number of successful 
campaigns, Sn, and the total number of campaigns, n. This formula 
is expressed below: 
R = Sn/n 
When R = 1, all campaigns have been successful. There is an 
inverse correlation between R and the likelihood of a stronger 
positive signal from successful campaigns.  
B. CROWDFUNDING AS A NEGATIVE SIGNAL 
Early commentary has argued that a company who chooses to 
seek crowdfunding sends a negative signal. Some legal academics 
that have addressed crowdfunding and its implementing law, 
Regulation CF, have suggested that raising money through 
crowdfunding is a path that only low-quality companies will take. 
Michael Dorff, for example, is a vocal critic of crowdfunding. Dorff 
observes “[t]he core issue has nothing to do with disclosure: it's that 
these investments are going to be terrible.”83  He goes on to opine 
that crowdfunding is beyond repair as an idea and should be killed 
through “excessive regulation.”84 
Others take a more nuanced approach, but remain negative or at 
least skeptical of crowdfunding as currently designed. Some call for 
more disclosure to combat potential fraud.85 From the other end of 
                                                                                                                   
in which case S may need to be higher than 1 to send a positive signal. Conversely, if a 
company fails to hit their fundraising target, they may be forced to return investor funds. See 
17 C.F.R. §§ 227.304(d), 227.201(g) (2016). 
 83  Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CORP. L. 493, 496 (2014). 
 84  Id. at 523. 
 85  See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful 
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1767 (2012) (“[The] exemption for crowdfunding should 
include some affirmative disclosure requirements. Those disclosures could be less 
burdensome than those currently required under Regulation A, but they should still be 
sufficiently detailed to provide investors with sufficient information to enable them to make 
an informed investment decision.”). Merritt Fox cautions against giving up on disclosure and 
relying on proxies including signaling, at least for public issuances of formerly privately held 
securities: 
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the disclosure spectrum, some complain that what began as a 
promising idea has been made unworkable due to overregulation.86 
Crowdfunding disclosure is actually robust given the relatively 
small amounts of funds sought.87  Disclosure, however, no matter 
how robust, can only do so much when companies have limited track 
records and rely on unsophisticated investors to read and process 
the disclosures.88 
Still there are other concerns that the crowd may not choose 
investments as wisely as angels with years of experience or as VCs 
                                                                                                                   
First, the presence of these information asymmetries can lead to a severe adverse-
selection problem. This problem will prevent a substantial portion of worthy 
offerings from being successfully marketed unless, as an antidote, investors are 
made confident that issuers are providing a certain level of credible disclosure at 
the time of the offering. A regime relying solely on market-based antidotes to these 
problems—signaling, underwriter reputation, and accountant or credit-rating 
certification—and backed only by liability for intentional affirmative 
misrepresentation is, in many circumstances, not a sufficient solution. 
Fox, supra note 44, at 678. See also Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, 
Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 
935–37 (2011) (expressing concerns that crowdfunding will be vulnerable to some of the same 
abuses for fraud as under Rule 504). 
 86  See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1604–05 (2013) 
(noting that compromises regarding Regulation CF turned a “regulation-free zone into a quite 
heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both issuers and any intermediaries that assist 
them— so much so that it is difficult for us to see why a rational start-up entrepreneur would 
find it appealing to use the [crowdfunding] exemption at all.”) (citation omitted). 
 87  See Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, infra note 93, at 180 (arguing that 
Regulation CF “has largely been viewed as heavily favoring investor protection over capital 
formation,” especially regarding disclosure requirements”); Frank Vargas, Jennifer Dasari & 
Michael Vargas, Understanding Crowdfunding: The SEC’s New Crowdfunding Rules and the 
Universe of Public Fund-Raising, BUS. L. TODAY 1, 7 (Dec. 14 2015) 
https://businesslawtoday.org/2015/12/understanding-crowdfunding-the-secs-new-
crowdfunding-rules-and-the-universe-of-public-fund-raising/ (opining that crowdfunding 
requires “[private placement memorandum]”-like disclosures, annual reports and better 
quality financials”). 
 88  See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 594–95 (discussing OMRI BEN-
SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) in the crowdfunding context); see also C. Steven Bradford, 
Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 109–110 (2012) 
[hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding and Federal Securities Laws] (giving statistics and 
noting that “[m]any Americans are not financially literate.”); id. at 112 ( “Since crowdfunding 
sites are usually open to the general public, at least some of the people investing in 
crowdfunding offerings will not have the basic financial knowledge required to understand 
the risks.”); Vargas, Dasari & Vargas, supra note 87, at 8 (discussing how “[a] start-up simply 
would not be wise to take on an army of unsophisticated investors”). 
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who select investments as a profession.89 By its very nature, the 
crowd cannot provide advice and connections (so-called “value-
added services”90) ex post investment like angels and VCs.91   
Others question whether the crowd will be skilled at judging new 
business ideas.92 Or that crowdfunding can attract growth 
companies that make entrepreneurial legends, or only lifestyle 
companies with limited growth potential?93  
Others question the tactics companies use in early crowdfunding 
efforts, particularly selling certain types of “deferred” securities to 
the crowd, when those securities work better in traditional angel/VC 
finance when follow-on financing is more certain.94 For example, 
John Coyle and Joe Green have argued that the type of security sold 
                                                                                                                   
 89  Traditional entrepreneurial finance has succeeded in large part due to expert investors. 
See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 10, at 1494–96 (explaining that 
passive startup investors rely on angel and VC investors to take the lead in screening, due 
diligence, and engaging ex post with entrepreneurs). 
 90  See Reza Dibadj, Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 48 (2015) 
(“[C]rowdfunding broaches the topic of unbundling governance rights and value-added 
services from capital. Consider, for instance, that startup companies seeking funds from angel 
investors and venture capital firms typically also receive ‘value-added’ services in the form of 
strategic and management guidance, but crowdfunding essentially uncouples these services 
from the transfer of capital itself.”). 
 91  See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 79 (1998) (talking not about crowdfunding but earlier 
efforts at Internet investing, “[i]nvestors may also view the absence of outside expert 
involvement in Internet offerings as a negative signal.”). 
 92  See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 10, at 1493 (noting that 
“[w]hile crowd-based wisdom does not seem to be a good fit with startup investing, expert-
based investing has a proven track record”). 
 93  See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe SAFE, 102 
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 175 (2016) [hereinafter Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE] 
(“[M]any of the startups that choose to pursue crowdfunding as a means of raising capital do 
so because they have no other options, and they may still struggle to raise traditional venture 
financing down the road.”); Michael Lilly, Exploring the Finer Details of Regulation CF 
Crowdfunding, SQUARE 1 BANK 1, 2 (May 4, 2017), https://www.square1bank.com
/insights/exploring-the-finer-details-of-regulation-cf-crowdfunding/ (noting that “[i]f you are 
launching a lifestyle business . . . then Reg. CF is a solid option”); see also Nicholas Herdrich, 
Just Say No to Crowdfunding, 6 U.P.R. BUS. L.J. 157, 177 (2015) (stating that equity 
crowdfunding may give a “[n]egative impression [that the] business [was not] able to secure 
traditional funding sources earlier”); Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation: 
Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217, 254 (2015) ( “The end result 
would be that crowdfunding would be a signal, whether true or not, of poor quality.”) (citation 
omitted). But as this Article has already noted, not all companies that crowdfund will be 
lifestyle companies. See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text. 
 94  See infra notes 118–129 and accompanying text. 
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in some crowdfunding campaigns—the Simple Agreement for 
Future Equity (or “SAFE”)—is anything but safe.95 The SAFE itself 
is neither debt nor equity, and converts to actual equity only if the 
issuing company either raises a follow-on round of financing or is 
sold.96 Since many crowdfunding companies are predicted to be 
lifestyle companies that do not seek future funding or a quick sale, 
Coyle and Green fear that early investors (especially the 
unsophisticated crowd) who buy SAFEs will never see a return on 
their investment.97 
Still others question whether crowdfunding, by adding numerous 
small, unsophisticated investors, 98 will scare off angels and VCs 
who might want to make a follow-on investment.99 When prior 
investors complicate a company’s voting or capitalization table, 
sophisticated investors may take a pass and invest in another 
startup.100 
The arguments above are all reasons why conducting a 
crowdfunding campaign could be (and has been) viewed as a 
                                                                                                                   
 95  Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 171–74 (arguing that SAFEs 
are appropriate for startups coming out of the famous Y-combinator accelerator who go on to 
raise additional sums of venture capital, but not well understood and potentially hazardous 
for inexperienced startups seeking crowdfunding). 
 96  See id. at 171–72; see also Wroldsen, supra note 17, at 574 (“SAFEs do not include any 
provisions related to fiduciary duties or information rights and expressly state that SAFE 
investors are not shareholders of the company.”). 
 97  Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 175–76 (explaining that non-
tech startups selling SAFE securities “are less likely to be candidates for VC investment and 
more likely to evolve into either lifestyle businesses for the founders . . . or companies that 
rely on debt financings (such as bank loans) and reinvested profits to support additional 
growth” ). 
 98  See Hurt, supra note 93, at 242–43 (noting the existence of “amateur” and 
unsophisticated investors in crowdfunding).  
 99  See, e.g., Gregory D. Deschler, Comment, Wisdom of the Intermediary Crowd: What the 
Proposed Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1145, 
1184–85 (2014) (“[A] crowd of investors with voting power in securities crowdfunding emits a 
warning signal and professional investors who might otherwise have bought into a 
crowdfunded company (and thereby provided at least some crowd investors with liquidity) 
steer away from such investments.”); Risks, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/investors 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (“Venture capitalists are uncomfortable when startups have many 
small investors (they don’t like collecting thousands of signatures).”); Vargas, Dasari & 
Vargas, supra note 87 (referring to horror stories of some startups’ crowdfunding donors 
disrupting a company’s operations, “[a] start-up simply would not be wise to take on an army 
of unsophisticated investors for the sake of a few thousand dollars.”); Wieczorek, supra note 
81, at 283 (“Another potential downside to issuing crowdfunded securities is the prospect of 
hundreds of small investors.”). 
 100  See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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negative signal to follow-on investors. In sum, commenters argue if 
a company crowdfunds, the company signals to angels and VCs that 
it: a) cannot raise money anywhere else; b) lacks expert investors to 
guide it; c) takes advantage of early investors; and d) complicates 
the company’s capitalization table. This paper will address these 
criticisms and demonstrate that, despite these concerns, 
crowdfunding can send positive signals and attract follow-up 
funding.  
C. CROWDFUNDING AS A POSITIVE SIGNAL 
Early commentators have not distinguished between successful 
and unsuccessful crowdfunding campaigns—that is the difference 
between companies that the crowd vets and companies that the 
crowd approves. Early commentary seems to assume that most 
attempts at crowdfunding will be unsuccessful due to unsatisfactory 
quality or fraudulent companies employing the medium. And if all 
crowdfunding campaigns fail, obviously these concerns have merit. 
But if some succeed, a divide—and indeed natural selection 
experiment—ensues. Despite the arguments outlined above, this 
Article argues that a successful crowdfunding campaign sends a 
positive signal of firm quality to follow-on investors.  
First, crowdfunding can be used skillfully to demonstrate a real-
world demand for a company’s product or service, and subsequently 
turn customers into brand advocates. Second, crowdfunding can 
“professionalize” a company in ways that traditional 
entrepreneurial finance does not. Third, issuing the SAFE security 
actually preserves follow-on investment because the SAFE is 
redeemable by the company, preventing VCs from having to deal 
with numerous small investors and a messy capitalization table. 
Finally, given the way that the SAFE functions, crowdfunding 
suggests a savvy entrepreneur—one who does not wish to dilute 
their own equity stake—rather than a desperate one. These 
arguments will now be discussed in turn. 
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1. Can Show Real-World Demand for a Company’s Product or 
Service. 
First, a successful crowdfunding campaign signals real-world 
demand for the company’s product or service.101 Conducting a 
successful crowdfunding campaign, especially if success becomes 
the exception rather than the rule, signals something positive about 
the company who successfully entices the crowd to buy in. As one 
commentator notes: “[c]rowdfunding platforms can . . . be used for 
effective product and service validation.”102 Who invests in 
crowdfunding campaigns? For companies selling consumer products 
or services, it is likely the company’s customers.103 These customers 
use the company’s product or service, like it, and think others will 
too. They invest in the company to capture this potential upside. 
Anecdotally, I have been told the same is true for smartphone apps 
and video games. While the same brand-loyalty argument may not 
apply to a highly-technical innovation, some growth companies 
dependent on consumers exist in the technology space.104 
                                                                                                                   
 101  See Mollick & Robb, supra note 60, at 75 (“Crowdfunding serves as an excellent tool for 
demonstrating demand, since it shows a willingness to pay for a product.”). See also Fleming 
& Sorenson, infra note 137, at 14 (“Venture capitalists can also potentially benefit [from 
crowdfunding by] having entrepreneurs eliminate some of the questions around whether a 
market exists for their product or service. . . .”); Herdrich, supra note 93, at 169 n.96 (2015) 
(“[A] successful crowdsourcing round may be one way to prove to angel or venture funds that 
there is a market for a new product.”); Christian Catalin et al., Can Equity Crowdfunding 
Democratize Access to Capital and Investment Opportunities?, MIT INNOVATION INITIATIVE 
12 (May 2016), https://innovation.mit.edu/assets/MIT_-Equity-Crowdfunding_Policy-
Brief.5.16.2016.pdf (“Backers of wildly successful Kickstarter campaigns (like Oculus and 
Pebble) not only provide startups the money they need to build prototypes and scale, but also 
generate the demand signal that professional investors later rely on when choosing which 
ventures to fund.”). 
 102  Judd Hollas, Why Venture Capitalists Are Turning to Crowdfunding, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/240984. See also Epi Ludvik Nekaj, 
Five Reasons Why Equity Crowdfunding Beats Venture Capital, VIRGIN (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.virgin.com/entrepreneur/five-reasons-why-equity-crowdfunding-beats-venture-
capital (“The beauty of crowdfunding is that a community can show support through their 
wallets and put their weight behind [an] entrepreneur and an idea.”).  
 103  See Sunghan Ryu & Young-Gul Kim, A Typology of Crowdfunding Sponsors: Birds of a 
Feather Flock Together?, 16 ELEC.COMMERCE RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS 43, 48 (2016) 
(noting that the “avid fan” of the product or service being crowdfunded is one of the largest 
groups of investors (emphasis removed)); see also Ricarda B. Bouncken et al., Crowdfunding: 
The Current State of Research, 14 INT’L BUS. & ECON. RES. J. 407, 411 (2015) (noting that 
with a crowdfunding campaign, the company’s “base of potential customers is increased”). 
 104  For example, Angry Birds started as an iPhone app.  See generally Paul Kendall, Angry 
Birds: The Story Behind iPhone’s Gaming Phenomenon, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2011, 5:30 
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Thus, in the right context, crowdfunding shows follow-on 
investors that the company has a real customer base and that there 
is demand for its product or service.105 When selecting their 
investments, angels and VCs consider whether the company (i) 
demonstrates a market for a product or service; and (ii) shows that 
it is fulfilling that market demand.106 
Further, having individuals not only as customers but as 
investors can help to increase the company’s market reach. Those 
customers or users, now investors, can become brand advocates for 
                                                                                                                   
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/video-games/8303173/Angry-Birds-the-story-
behind-iPhones-gaming-phenomenon.html. Since 2009, Angry Birds has enjoyed substantial 
periods of valuation and growth.   Jussi Rosendahl & Tuomas Forsell, ‘Angry Birds’ Maker 
Rovio Plans IPO to Spur Growth, M&A, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2017, 1:22 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rovio-ipo/angry-birds-maker-rovio-plans-ipo-to-spur-
growth-ma-idUSKCN1BG0HY (“Rovio saw rapid growth after the 2009 launch of the original 
‘Angry Birds’ game . . . .”); see also Ibrahim, supra note 1, at 578 (discussing consumer product 
growth companies raising funds on Title II site CircleUp). 
 105  See CROWDFUND CAPITAL ADVISORS, HOW DOES CROWDFUNDING IMPACT JOB CREATION, 
COMPANY REVENUE AND PROFESSIONAL INVESTOR INTEREST? 4, 10 (2014), 
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/research/ (explaining that crowdfunding has a 
marketing benefit that translates into sales); Ajay Agrawal et al., Some Simple Economics of 
Crowdfunding, INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 63, 72–73 (2014) (discussing how equity 
crowdfunding can benefit the company as a form of market research to predict product 
demand); Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 1, 3 (2014) (“[F]unding need not be the only goal of a crowdfunding effort . . . 
crowdfunding has been used by founders to demonstrate demand for a proposed project, 
which can lead to funding from more traditional sources.”); John Beckwith, Predicting Success 
in Equity Crowdfunding (Apr. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University 
of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons), http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1000&context=joseph_wharton_scholars (“[E]quity crowdfunding can serve as a 
validation tool to ensure that there is substantial demand for the product, providing a 
particularly informative type of market research.”).  
 106  See Mann, supra note 73, at 976 (“The key is ‘sustainable differentiation’: something 
special about the particular firm that will enable it to do something that its competitors will 
not be able to do for the immediate future.” (citation omitted)); id. ( “[E]ven before investors 
consider whether a firm can protect a market leader position, they will want to know whether 
the product is one that customers need so desperately that the firm could earn significant 
revenues from sales of the product.”); Ron Miller, Can Crowdfunding and Venture Capital 
Coexist?, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2016, 9:42 PM) https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2016/03/82466-can-crowdfunding-and-venture-capital-coexist/ (“Equity crowdfunding 
provides a level of feedback that can’t be easily replicated; there is no greater validation than 
people investing their hard-earned money into a company’s future. The early market 
validation this provides is absolutely critical, a fact that venture capitalists are sure to 
appreciate.”). 
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the company.107 One article noted the “[s]ignificant number of 
owners/brand advocates” as a positive reason to use equity 
crowdfunding.108 Funding portals likewise indicate that 
crowdfunding can be used to convert customers into brand 
advocates.109 
In sum, a successful crowdfunding campaign signals both a 
demand for a company’s product or service and a company’s capacity 
to meet that demand. By turning customers into owners, a 
crowdfunding campaign can elevate a company by creating brand 
advocates out of users.110 A successful crowdfunding campaign can 
advertise or market the company to new users.111 
                                                                                                                   
 107  Brett Relander, With the Right Incentives Loyal Customers Will Become Brand 
Advocates, ENTREPRENEUR (June 2, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/246579 
(discussing that loyal customers can grow a company through referral programs). 
 108  Herdrich, supra note 93, at 177.  
 109  See Risks, WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/investors (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) 
(“Most of the fun from investing in startups comes from how you can help them! You can offer 
product feedback, introduce founders to relevant people in your network, or evangelize 
product launches.”); Title III Equity Crowdfunding on SeedInvest, SEEDINVEST: RAISING 
CAPITAL, https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/raising-capital/title-iii-equity-crowdfunding (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2018) (“By inviting its early adopters to participate in a Reg CF [Regulation 
Crowdfunding] offering, a company can help turn users into brand evangelists. Customers 
who own stock in a business are more likely to recommend that company to others and 
increase the amount they spend with that company. Reg CF gives startups a way to build 
deep brand loyalty with their customers, a key driver of growth for early stage companies . . 
. . Reg CF is about more than just fundraising. It is an opportunity for a company to make a 
marketing splash and create an army of brand ambassadors.”); Why Wefunder?, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/faq/founders (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (“A crowd of investors can help 
in ways traditional investors can’t. They are often your most passionate evangelists.”). Non-
U.S. equity crowdfunding portals make the same indication. See Steven Male, Ultimate Guide 
to Marketing Your Equity Crowdfunding Offer, SNOWBALL EFFECT (May 21, 2015), 
https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/ultimate-guide-to-marketing-your-equity-
crowdfunding-offer (“Besides the inevitable value in having a whole new bunch of people 
invested in and buying your products, the crowd can also be harnessed to promote products, 
leverage skillsets and capabilities that are missing in the company, and provide a credible 
source of market feedback and ideas.”); Quarterly Company Progress Report, SNOWBALL 
EFFECT (Dec. 2015), https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/companies-update-december-2015 
(“[C]ompanies can unlock significant value from shareholders who act as advocates for their 
products if they’re mobilised by engaging and regular information.”).  
 110  See Relander, supra note 107.  
 111  Victor Fleischer has argued that deal structures, such as Google’s IPO, can advertise or 
have a “branding effect” in addition to transmitting information. Victor Fleischer, Brand New 
Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006); 
see also D. Gordon Smith, The “Branding Effect” of Contracts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189, 
196 (2007) (“Though Fleischer refers to this form of advertising as ‘consumer signaling,’ it is 
not signaling in the conventional economic sense because it is not aimed at mitigating 
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2. Can “Professionalize” the Company.  
Conducting a crowdfunding campaign can force an entrepreneur 
to “professionalize” the company. The entrepreneur must put 
together disclosure, deal terms, and other information in a 
professional format, viewable on the Internet. This may not lead to 
a stronger product or service, but having to work with attorneys and 
accountants and describe what the company is doing can help the 
entrepreneur sharpen her strategy and explain it to others.112 A 
company willing to bear these costs at an early stage signals to 
investors that it is willing to “do it right.”  
Selling to friends and family, or even angels and VCs, will not 
force the company to do the same legwork. Friends and family likely 
invest under Rule 504 (if they are unaccredited) or Rule 506 (if they 
are accredited), and neither rule requires disclosure.113 When angels 
and VCs invest, they do so under Rule 506, which does not require 
disclosure.114 Thus, Regulation CF forces companies to present 
themselves professionally in ways that the prior securities law 
exemptions do not. 115 
                                                                                                                   
information asymmetries”) (citation omitted); id. (“This marketing component of deal 
structures is not focused on the transmission of information, but instead on the creation of 
meaning.”) (citation omitted).  
 112  By analogy, Lynn Stout has argued that in large corporations, forcing directors to go 
through procedural hurdles (hiring lawyers, bankers, etc.) to meet their duty of care can 
actually lead to better substantive decisions. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An 
Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 693 (2002). 
 113  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.506 (2017) (exempting transactions from federal 
registration under regulation D); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2017) (stipulating under 
Rule 506, no disclosure is required as long as the investors are accredited); cf. Exempted 
transactions, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012).  
 114  See C.F.R. § 230.506 (2017) (exempting transactions such as limited offers and sales 
from disclosure); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended 
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEUR BUS. 
L. J. 287, 295 (2012) (“Regulation D offerings overwhelmingly are made under Rule 506. Even 
offerings of one million dollars or less—offerings that are suited for Rule 504—are 
overwhelmingly made under Rule 506. Similarly, the data show offerings of one million to 
five million dollars—offerings that are suited for Rule 505—are also overwhelmingly made 
under Rule 506.”); Cable,  supra note 9, at 132 (“The exemption from registration that most 
startup companies rely on is Rule 506 of Regulation D . . . .”).  
 115  Additionally, as investors gain more experience with crowdfunding campaigns, the 
disclosure requirements could be revised to better address information asymmetry concerns. 
See infra Part IV.B. 
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As with patenting activity, doing the legwork to run a 
crowdfunding campaign signals entrepreneurial discipline and 
competence.116 Crowdfunding also enables angels and VCs to 
conduct their due diligence more easily than they could on a startup 
that has not crowdfunded.117 Thus, crowdfunding helps a company 
directly, by making it easier for VCs and angels to invest, and 
indirectly, by signaling that the entrepreneur is willing to put in the 
work to run a real company.  
 
3. In Defense of SAFEs.  
The SAFE security is “a deferred equity investment that will 
prove valuable to the holder if, and only if, the company that issues 
it raises a subsequent round of financing, is sold, or goes public.”118 
Due to its binary nature (converting to common stock upon a major 
event or remaining a SAFE),119 the SAFE is likely to result in a 
complete loss of investment for the less successful crowdfunding 
companies, and possibly for even moderately successful lifestyle 
companies. However, this paper has two responses in defense of 
SAFEs. 
First, with no resale market for crowdfunding securities on the 
horizon,120 common stock or other equity in these same companies 
may in practice prove to be equally worthless. In order for 
crowdfunding investors to have liquidity in their investment, a 
                                                                                                                   
 116  See Mollick & Robb, supra note 60, at 75 (“[V]enture capitalists look for preparation as 
a signal that entrepreneurs understand the risks and pitfalls of a new business, and have a 
plan to overcome obstacles that present themselves.”); see also Younkin & Kashkooli, infra 
note 134, at 32 (discussing how crowdfunding sites can “help founders develop a business 
plan, practice their pitch, and set appropriate benchmarks for success”). 
 117  See Hollas, supra note 102 (“Crowdfunding platforms inherently leverage technology to 
categorize multiple aspects of the companies seeking capital and present them in a 
standardized format that can quickly be reviewed by any potential investor. This allows for 
a much quicker due-diligence process than traditional means.”); cf. Mollick & Robb, supra 
note 60, at 76 (“[T]he crowd also does a good job performing due diligence on projects . . . 
because the crowd, collectively, is wise in spotting fraud.”). 
 118  Coyle & Green, The Not-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 172. 
 119  See id. 
 120  See Scott Shane, Will Equity Crowdfunding Buyers Be Able to Sell Their Shares?, 
ENTREPRENEUR (June 30, 2015) https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247832# (exhibiting 
skepticism of a resale market for crowdfunding securities); cf. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, 
supra note 1, at 580 n. 106 (explaining the high minimum value VCs require to invest, which 
was around $5.2 million in 2003 (citation omitted)). 
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company that crowdfunds will need to attract follow-on investors, 
and will need to find an acquirer or undertake an IPO to achieve 
liquidity.121 But companies would need to follow these steps with or 
without SAFE. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the way SAFEs are 
written now encourages angels and VCs to follow a crowdfunding 
round. VCs do not like a messy capitalization table, or to “share” 
their traditional equity stake with earlier investors.122 Because 
SAFEs are not technically equity—and therefore do not add 
shareholders to the company whose votes must be procured—nor 
debt with looming interest payment obligations, the investments do 
not, before conversion, complicate later VC investments.123  
At the time of a SAFE’s conversion to equity, two saving graces 
help the attractiveness of the investment. First, SAFEs typically 
convert into non-voting stock, thus eliminating the voting concerns 
that typically come with a number of small investors.124 Even more 
importantly, SAFE provisions typically include redemption 
clauses.125 These redemption clauses allow companies to 
“repurchase the SAFEs of non-accredited investors for the fair 
market value of the instrument, as determined by an independent 
appraiser of the company’s choosing.”126 Therefore, a VC preferring 
a clean capitalization table could simply buy out the SAFE holders 
before their SAFEs convert to equity.  
Coyle & Green rightly observe that crowdfunding investors “can 
be prevented from seeing the bulk of the returns from the most 
successful companies they fund.”127 VCs can buy crowdfunding 
                                                                                                                   
 121  See Shane, supra note 120 (identifying the different methods for start-up companies to 
achieve liquidity).  
 122  See Ibrahim, Angel Investors supra note 11, at 1429 (“A start-up marred by a 
complicated angel round is unattractive to venture capitalists because it requires them to 
‘unwind’ the non-standard angel preferences in order to strike the venture capitalists’ 
standard deal.”). 
 123  See id. 
 124  Coyle & Green, The Note-So-Safe SAFE, supra note 93, at 179 (critiquing the non-voting 
nature as leaving crowdfunding investors with SAFEs that convert “at the mercy of the 
founders and more sophisticated investors” but observing that these investors “would at least 
be owed fiduciary duties by the company’s board of directors”).  
 125  See id. at 178–79. 
 126  Id.  
 127  Id. at 179. 
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investors out if larger gains loom for the company. In short, the huge 
payoff from correctly picking the next Facebook is no longer there 
for the crowdfunding investors; instead, it all belongs to the 
entrepreneurs and VCs. If crowdfunding investors become wise to 
this practice, then perhaps crowdfunding falls apart. 
Perhaps SAFE securities should be rewritten to give 
crowdfunding investors a premium on buyout, or factored into the 
appraiser’s initial valuation.128 Companies giving redeemed 
crowdfunding investors a premium would soften the blow of 
redemption. While the investors may lose if a startup does go on to 
a public offering, they would win on the other startups that VCs 
fund but then ultimately flounder or fail. VCs, of course, may choose 
to be generous with SAFE redemptions out of litigation fears and 
not concern for crowdfunding’s long-term viability as a matter of 
game theory.129 
 
4. Crowdfunding Can Reveal a Savvy Entrepreneur.  
Crowdfunding can be a savvy move for entrepreneurs for social 
and financial reasons. An entrepreneur seeking initial capital to get 
her venture off the ground has a few potential choices: 
bootstrapping, asking friends and family, or seeking money from 
angels, VCs—and now the crowd. Not all of these choices will be 
available to all entrepreneurs.  
Bootstrapping is using an entrepreneur’s personal resources to 
fund the startup, for example, by putting company expenses on a 
credit card.130 As most growth startups fail, bootstrapping these 
types of companies is a significant financial risk to an 
entrepreneur.131 A Kauffman Foundation study found that the more 
                                                                                                                   
 128  There is precedent for this. See Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 466 (1977) 
(affirming a circuit court determination that a plaintiff stated a cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty when Morgan Stanley valued a company at a $125 per share for minority 
shareholders and $150 per share for the majority shareholder). 
 129  But see Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding's Curious Conundrum, 7 
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 415–16 (2012) (discussing the collective action 
problem of a number of small shareholders each with a small financial stake having the 
motivation or coordination to sue for crowdfunding fraud or other violations). 
 130  See Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a 
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 821–22 (2004) (discussing bootstrapping methods). 
 131  RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH PAD: INSIDE Y COMBINATOR, SILICON VALLEY'S MOST 
EXCLUSIVE SCHOOL FOR STARTUPS 14 (2012) (quoting well-known entrepreneur Paul Graham 
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credit card debt a new company incurs, the more likely it is to fail.132 
And as explored more below, not all entrepreneurs have access to 
personal funds. 
Asking friends and family to invest in an entrepreneur’s new 
company is a time-honored tradition, but it requires the 
entrepreneur to have wealthier friends and family.133 It also comes 
with social and financial costs. Socially, there is a risk that the 
entrepreneur’s requests are rejected, or that successful requests for 
capital put added pressure on the entrepreneur to succeed.134 
Financially, selling off common stock to friends and family at a low 
valuation, which is typical for a nascent company, dilutes the 
entrepreneur’s ownership share.135 If the entrepreneur can hold off 
on selling equity until the company is more proven, she can sell 
stock at a higher price and suffer less dilution (i.e., retain a greater 
ownership stake).  
As discussed, crowdfunding campaigns may entail selling SAFE 
securities, which do not dilute the entrepreneur at all at the time of 
issuance. Thus, crowdfunding can “extend the runway” before the 
first actual equity round.136 This enables the entrepreneur to sell 
                                                                                                                   
as stating, “If you start a startup, you'll probably fail. Most startups fail. It's the nature of the 
business.”). 
 132  Robert H. Scott III, The Use of Credit Card Debt by New Firms, KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION 
1 (Aug. 2009) (“[C]redit card debt reduces the likelihood that a new business will survive in 
the first three years of operation. The results, which were statistically significant, found that 
every $1,000 increase in credit card debt increases the probability a firm will close by 2.2 
percent.”). 
 133  See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of how crowdfunding can reduce inequality between 
well-heeled, well-connected entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not enjoy those benefits. 
 134  Peter Younkin & Keyvan Kashkooli, What Problems Does Crowdfunding Solve?, 58 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 20, 28 (2016) (suggesting that crowdfunding is a preferable alternative to friends 
and family because “[f]ounders may be reluctant to ask those most willing to give for the fear 
of the social cost of being denied or of the project failing”). 
 135  See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 74 (1965) 
(discussing how new issuances dilute existing shareholders). Sometimes friends and family 
receive convertible notes or SAFEs instead of common stock. In such cases, the dilution 
argument that follows is inapplicable. 
 136  This is what venture debt does for venture capital. See Ibrahim, Debt as Venture 
Capital, supra note 75, at 1196 (“A start-up that can continue to grow and achieve milestones 
using debt receives a higher valuation when more equity is eventually sold. A higher 
valuation means that existing shareholders do not have to sell as much of the firm to raise 
the needed funds. Therefore, venture debt ‘enables the company to buy an additional six-to-
twelve months of time so that they are able to get a much better valuation in their next 
financing round.’”) (citations omitted). 
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higher-priced equity later, which dilutes her ownership stake less 
than an early equity round would. Even with non-SAFE issuances, 
crowdfunding allows the entrepreneur to separate the traditional 
bundling of funds and value-added services. As I have observed, “the 
inherent passivity of [Regulation CF] investors—a seeming 
negative—would actually appeal to entrepreneurs who wish to 
unbundle the cash and value-added service components of 
traditional entrepreneurial finance. In obtaining only cash from 
investors, these startups could also obtain a better price for their 
shares . . . .” 137 
IV. NORMATIVE AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
This Article has argued that, for many reasons, companies 
completing a successful crowdfunding campaign send a positive 
signal of firm quality to follow-on investors. This final Part 
addresses some normative and legal implications that flow from this 
argument.  
A. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: OPENING OPPORTUNITIES TO MORE 
ENTREPRENEURS 
First, not all entrepreneurs have access to other sources of initial 
capital.138 This may be especially true for women and minority 
entrepreneurs, who have been historically underrepresented.139 
                                                                                                                   
 137  Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 1, at 590 (citation omitted); see also Lee 
Fleming & Olav Sorenson, Financing by and for the Masses: An Introduction to the Special 
Issue on Crowdfunding, 58 CAL. MGMT. REV. 5, 13 (2016) (noting that “[f]rom the perspective 
of the entrepreneur . . . large allocations of equity to the venture capitalist often represent a 
cost that they would rather avoid[,]” making crowdfunding an attractive first step). 
 138  See Andrew Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 621 (2015) (“The 
traditional first source for entrepreneurial financing is from the entrepreneur’s friends and 
family, as well as their own personal savings. Most people, however, have negligible personal 
savings, and the same can be said of their friends, so it comes down to whether the 
entrepreneur has a wealthy relative.”) (citation omitted); Thomas Murphy, Note, Playing to 
a New Crowd: How Congress Could Break the Startup Status Quo by Raising the Cap on the 
Jobs Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption, 58 B.C. L. REV. 775, 779 (2017) (lamenting “the 
exclusive social dynamics in the venture capital market, where the strength of an 
entrepreneur’s network is often as important as the strength of his or her idea”). 
 139  See Murphy, supra note 138, at 787 (“Evidence further suggests that women and 
minorities are disproportionately ignored by traditional forms of startup financing.”); Susan 
R. Jones, Jacqueline Lainez, & Debbie Lovinsky, Viewing Value Creation by Business Lawyers 
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Perhaps they do not have well-heeled friends and family who can 
fund their business venture.140 Maybe they do not have the assets 
or income necessary to obtain a credit card with a high limit, and 
therefore cannot bootstrap.141 Crowdfunding shows signs of being 
more ethnically and gender diverse than traditional 
entrepreneurship. One commentator notes that over twenty percent 
of crowdfunded companies have “at least one female founder” 
compared to only eight percent of VC funded companies with 
“female founders.”142 Thus, crowdfunding may be a necessity for 
some entrepreneurs seeking early-stage capital.   
Even for those entrepreneurs that can obtain friends-and- family 
money, a “capital gap” may persist in terms of next funds needed, 
but it still being too early for professional investors to consider 
coming in.143 And the capital gap may be substantial.144  
Angels can fill this capital gap to some extent, as angels invest 
smaller amounts and are active in more geographic regions than 
VCs.145 But geographic discrepancy exists even in the angel 
                                                                                                                   
Through the Lens of Transactional Legal Clinics, 15 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 49, 95 (2014) (“In 
addition to limited access to capital, minority entrepreneurs may not meet bank credit 
approval criteria.”). 
 140  See Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker, The Global Significance of Crowdfunding: 
Solving the SME Funding Problem and Democratizing Access to Capital, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. 
L. REV. 347, 356 (2016) (“‘[C]rowdfunding’ enables entrepreneurs who traditionally face 
financing constraints to obtain capital from anyone in the world via the Internet.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 141  Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885, 
948–49 (2018). 
 142  See Bradford, Crowdfunding and Federal Securities Laws, supra note 88, at 103–04 
(“Crowdfunding makes new sources of capital available to small businesses. It opens business 
investment to smaller investors who have not traditionally participated in private securities 
offerings. Those investors have less money to invest, so they would be willing to fund smaller 
business opportunities that the venture capitalists and angel investors would not touch. 
Crowdfunding also gives poorer entrepreneurs whose friends and family lack the wealth to 
provide seed capital somewhere else to turn.”). 
 143  See Cable, supra note 4, at 108 (describing the “funding gap” that exists after an 
entrepreneur’s personal/family resources run out and before VCs will invest). 
 144  See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It's Time To Allow General Solicitation 
and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (“Estimates indicate, 
however, that financial markets fall short by some $60 billion annually in meeting the 
demand of small companies for early-stage private equity financing. This unmet need is 
referred to as the funding gap.”) (citations omitted). 
 145  Ibrahim, Angel Investors, supra note 11, at 1418 (“Angels fill the funding gap as to both 
time and capital, functioning as a ‘conveyor belt’ that moves young start-ups toward waiting 
venture capitalists.”) (citation omitted). 
 
 2018]   CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS 229 
 
community. If an entrepreneur is not proximate to angels or VCs in 
Silicon Valley, Austin, or New York, for example, she is unlikely to 
get funded.146 Crowdfunding, while not the panacea of freeing “the 
geographic constraint that has long hindered entrepreneurship in 
rural areas,” has shown “modest” success in funding companies in 
“states that are largely off the radar of traditional VCs and angel 
investors, such as Idaho, New Mexico and South Carolina.”147 
If a successful crowdfunding campaign serves as a positive signal 
to follow-on investors, then traditionally disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs will be on par with—or even above—the well-heeled 
entrepreneurs who raised initial capital from friends and family. In 
other words, if angels and VCs view successful crowdfunding 
campaigns as a positive signal, then a successful crowdfunding 
campaign will not disadvantage an entrepreneur who cannot avail 
herself of bootstrapping or friends-and-family capital. This 
argument supports crowdfunding proponents’ initial plan to 
“democratize” startup investing.148 
B. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: CROWDFUNDING CAN REDUCE 
INFORMATIONAL LOCK-IN 
A successful crowdfunding campaign (as opposed to investment 
from friends, family, early angels or seed-stage VCs) can also 
mitigate “informational lock-in.”149 Informational lock-in occurs 
when early investors enjoy informational advantages about the 
company when it comes to pricing and participating in its follow-on 
                                                                                                                   
 146  See Schwartz, supra note 143, at 622 (“[T]here is tremendous competition for [angel and 
VC] investments and such investors are interested in certain types of companies, often in 
limited geographic areas. Importantly, angels and VCs rely heavily on connections, making 
it difficult to get funded in the absence of pre-existing relationships with such investors or 
their acquaintances.”) (citation omitted); Ibrahim, The Next Silicon Valley, supra note 61, at 
731 (discussing instances of entrepreneurs moving to Silicon Valley because they could not 
obtain funding in their prior locations). 
 147  Schwartz, supra note 141, at 947–48; see also id. at 948 (“In the end, although it 
obviously has not transformed Bismarck into Boston, or Pine Bluff into Palo Alto, 
crowdfunding has in fact achieved some real amount of geographic inclusivity.”).  
 148  See Democratizing Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011); see also 
Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 662 (2016) 
(“Inclusivity is core to the nature of crowdfunding as a distinct form of capital raising.”). 
 149  Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? 
Some Evidence from Silicon Valley, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1104, 1105 (2012). 
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rounds.150 Early investors can use this informational advantage to 
sell themselves cheap equity in follow-rounds and thereby dilute 
the founder’s share of the company more than it would otherwise be 
diluted through arms-length fundraising.151  
A successful crowdfunding campaign combats the informational 
lock-in problem by substituting the crowd for the early investor with 
the informational advantage. The crowd, by definition, as a large 
and dispersed group, will not be able to employ informational lock-
in to its advantage due to collective action problems.  Thus, by 
turning to the crowd instead of other early investors, founders can 
prevent dilution of their shares of the company not only by issuing 
SAFEs, but also by obtaining better pricing in follow-on rounds. 
C. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: CROWDFUNDING SIGNALS CAN REDUCE 
NEED FOR DISCLOSURE 
If the costs of raising capital through Regulation CF are high,152 
due in part to legal costs,153 then perhaps we can determine what 
types of disclosures actually are useful in reducing information 
asymmetry and hone Regulation CF’s requirements accordingly. As 
it currently stands, Regulation CF requires significant disclosure 
for small companies.154 Is it the risk factors that potential investors 
care about? The company-specific business plan descriptions? The 
                                                                                                                   
 150  See id. (noting that informational lock-in occurs “when information asymmetry between 
a firm’s existing investors and potential outside investors make it difficult to obtain 
competitive financing”). Although this informational lock-in is typically an issue in the 
banking context, Broughman & Fried observed it may occur in subsequent VC financing 
rounds. Id. at 1107. 
 151  See id. (discussing that informational lock-in “enable[s] the existing investors to extract 
rents in subsequent financings”). 
 152  See Lou Bevilacqua, How Much Does It Cost to Raise Money Through Equity 
Crowdfunding?, BEVILACQUA PLLC (Sept. 26, 2016), http://bevilacquapllc.com/much-cost-
raise-money-equity-crowdfunding/ (estimating an “all-in” cost from $60,000 to $150,000 for a 
$1,000,000 equity crowdfunding offering). 
 153  See id. (estimating these legal costs between $3,000 and $20,000); see also Thompson & 
Langevoort, supra note 86, at 1605 (noting that Title III imposes “a quite heavy and costly 
set of responsibilities on . . . issuers”). 
 154  See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1) (2016) (requiring disclosure of, among other things, the 
issuer’s name and physical address; the website of the issuer; the names of directors and 
officers; a description of the issuer’s business plan; a description of the issuer’s financial 
situation; and a description of the issuer’s ownership and capital structure).  
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financials?155 We must also distinguish here between disclosure that 
is useful to investors in the crowdfunding campaign itself and those 
disclosures that are useful to follow-on investors. Perhaps the 
disclosures overlap, but maybe they do not. 
One new study examines the signaling effect of “hard” and “soft” 
information disclosed by a company attempting to raise capital from 
the crowd.156 Hard information includes items such as “age, 
financial condition of the issuer” and “executive team size.”157 Soft 
information, on the other hand, includes an “issuer’s social capital” 
and “responsiveness to prospective investors on the crowdfunding 
platform.”158 The study finds that hard information has no or 
limited value to potential investors,159 while soft information 
(particularly a strong social media following) sends a strong positive 
signal of company quality.160  
I am not aware of any studies examining angels’ or VCs’ use of 
crowdfunding disclosures in making their own investment 
decisions.161 Should mandatory disclosures of hard information 
prove of limited value to professional investors, as perhaps they are 
to the crowd, then the SEC may be able to limit disclosures of hard 
information in crowdfunding campaigns without negative effects. 
This would make crowdfunding a cheaper option to more 
entrepreneurs seeking funding. 
                                                                                                                   
 155  See generally 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(t)(2) (2017)  (requiring that an issuer must have an 
independent public accountant review the financial statements for target offering amounts 
that total between $107,000 and $535,000 based on sales for the preceding twelve months); § 
227.201(t)(3) (requiring that an independent public accountant audit financial statements for 
offerings exceeding $535,000 in sales for the previous twelve months, unless dealing with a 
first-time issuer, who need only provide financial statements previously audited by an 
independent public accountant if available or statements previously reviewed by such 
accountant). 
 156  Anzhela Knyazeva & Vladimir I. Ivanov, Soft and Hard Information and Signal 
Extraction in Securities Crowdfunding (Nov. 17, 2017) (unpublished paper) (on file with 
author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3051380.  
 157  Id. at 12. 
 158  Id. at 16–17. 
 159  Id. at 26 (“Hard information about issuer quality based on current accounting 
characteristics and past track record has limited relation to offering success.”). 
 160  Id. at 28 (“[S]ocial media following is significantly positively related to both offering 
success and offering proceeds.”). 
 161  But see Part III.C.3. (arguing that forcing companies to put together the disclosure 
serves another purpose—professionalizing the company). 
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The signaling/disclosure relationship is complicated. Angels and 
VCs use contracts, networks, and signals when sorting among 
potential investments.162 Angels and VCs may or may not get any 
formal disclosure, as the law does not require it.163 Thus, with 
disclosure historically playing a smaller role in angel/VC selection, 
contracts being of limited sorting utility, and networks diminishing 
in importance with the pervasiveness of the Internet, signals take 
on added importance. The signal sent by a successful crowdfunding 
campaign should top the list of signals that angels and VCs rely on 
going forward. 
Although signaling cannot completely replace disclosure in 
combating information asymmetry,164 perhaps it can play a larger 
role in the relative balance in further amendments to Regulation 
CF. Crowdfunding must be affordable for entrepreneurs to be able 
to use it, and current estimates suggest its costs can be excessive.165 
Crowdfunding signals may reduce the need for some disclosure, and 
should the SEC reduce the amount of disclosure required, the cost 
of conducting a crowdfunding campaign would likewise drop. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is evidence that angels and VCs are using crowdfunding 
as a new source of deal flow.166 As one commentator states: “Given 
                                                                                                                   
 162  See supra Part II.B.  (showing angels and VCs use contracts, networks, and signal when 
sorting potential investors). 
 163  See supra note 114 and accompanying text. But see STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 587 (Foundation Press, 4th ed.., 2015) (“The 
requirements of the securities laws aside, most sophisticated investors in the private 
placement market will simply avoid offerings that lack a private placement memorandum”). 
 164  See generally Fox, supra note 44, at 687. 
 165  See Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad 
Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2012) (“Can this new regulatory-laden exemption be 
useful to small entrepreneurs? It is difficult to imagine that for offerings under $250,000 
either issuers or intermediaries would be willing to undertake the time, cost and risk of 
potential liabilities.”); Seth A. Orangeburg, Bridgefunding: Crowdfunding and the Market for 
Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 437 (2015) (“Raising money by 
selling stock costs at least $25,000 in legal fees. Therefore, it would be irrational to raise less 
than $25,000 by selling stock in all instances.”) (citation omitted). 
 166  See CROWDFUND CAPITAL ADVISORS, supra note 105, at 11 (“There is a consistent refrain 
that professional investors will not want to work with companies that have received 
crowdfunding investments. The data from this study suggest the exact opposite . . . . Several 
founders remarked that they received calls from angel groups that had not even allowed them 
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the fact that more startups and small businesses are launching 
crowdfunding campaigns, it’s no wonder that many venture capital 
firms are turning to crowdfunding platforms to access new deal 
flow.”167 Angels and VCs’ increased reliance on crowdfunded 
companies suggests that early predictions about crowdfunding as a 
fund-raising tool of last resort are incorrect. Indeed, as this Article 
has argued, a successful crowdfunding campaign signals a 
company’s high quality to follow-on investors. Through its signaling 
function, crowdfunding can democratize entrepreneurship and 
make it more affordable. Meaning there is hope, still, that 
Regulation CF may live up to its initial promise. 
 
  
                                                                                                                   
to pitch, and were receiving term sheets from [the angel groups]. These findings indicate that 
angels and venture capital groups may look to entrepreneurs to prove their ability to execute 
and fundraise from the crowd prior to investing. Doing so may [de-risk] their investment if 
they can see an entrepreneur has traction from the crowd.”). 
167 Hollas, supra note 102.  
